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Consent to Surgery
Gerald M. Smith* and R. Joseph Olinger**
T HE LEGAL ASPECTS of a patient's consent to operation, or the
lack of such consent, are many and varied. The general rule
is that consent of the patient, or of someone authorized to act for
him, is necessary in order for a physician to legally operate.'
This rule is not altered by the fact that an unauthorized operation
is slight and ordinarily is not accompanied by serious conse-
quences. 2 Where no consent is present, a surgical operation upon
the body is a technical battery, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, appropriate damages may be recovered from the
physician. 3 The question as to whether consent, either express
or implied, has been given, is one of fact for the jury.4
Who may consent? A married woman, in full possession of
her faculties, has the power to submit to an operation upon her
person without the consent of her husband. In such a situation,
if the wife's consent is obtained, the husband's consent is un-
necessary, and this holds true even though the operation results
in the death of the wife. If the wife voluntarily submits to the
performance of the operation, her consent will be presumed in
the absence of false and fraudulent misrepresentations on the
part of the doctor.5 Where the wife is mentally incompetent, she
lacks the power of consent and her husband's consent is then
necessary.6
In like respect, a surgeon who operates on the husband will
not be held liable to the wife because he neglects to obtain the
wife's consent, provided that the husband is mentally capable of
giving his own consent.7 This legal principle has been held to
apply even though the husband was intoxicated at the time of the
operation and said operation resulted in the husband's death.8
*A.B., Allegheny College; Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
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1 Gregoris v. Manos, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 279, 40 N. E. 2d 466 (Ct. App. 1941);
Hively v. Higgs, 120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363 (1927).
2 Hively v. Higgs, supra, n. 1.
3 Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N. E. 2d 25 (1956).
4 Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N. E. 910 (1919).
5 State Use of Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889).
6 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562 (1906).
7 Rytkonen v. Lojacono, 269 Mich. 270, 253 N. W. 703 (1934).
8 Barker v. Heaney, 82 S. W. 2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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In regard to minors, the general rule is that the parents, one
or the other, must consent to an operation upon their minor
child, in the absence of an emergency, and that a minor has no
power to consent to such an operation. 9 For failure to obtain
such consent, the surgeon will be held liable.10 In the Zoski case,
a physician, without obtaining the consent of a child's parents,
issued an order to a private hospital to operate on the minor who
was nine and one-half years old. The operation was performed
without any knowledge either on the part of the operating sur-
geon or on the part of the hospital authorities that such consent
was lacking. The court held that the surgeon could not assume
that the physician had obtained the necessary consent and stated
at page 103:
In view of the child's age, the fact that neither of his parents
were with him at the time of the operation or came to the
hospital with him, and yet, giving all due weight to the memo
from the city physician, we cannot allow consent to be im-
plied in such situations. To do so would go far beyond the
laws laid down in the authorities cited and examined.
The age and maturity of the minor seem to be important
factors in determining whether the general rule in regard to
minors will be strictly construed or not. In Lacey v. Laird" it
was stated that ordinarily, where an eighteen year-old girl con-
sents to an operation, the surgeon will not be held liable for
even though the consent of the girl's parents was not obtained.
The court expressed its opinion, saying: 12
the term, "consent," carries with it the assumption that
previous full disclosure of the implications and probable con-
sequences of the proposed conduct to which such consent
applies has been given in such terms as may be fully com-
prehended by the person giving the consent. It necessarily
follows that consent requires a reasonable degree of maturity
of mind depending upon the intricacies of the subject matter
to which the consent is applicable.
A similar conclusion was reached in Bishop v. Shurly,13 where
a surgeon was relieved from liability for the death of a nineteen
year old minor when he administered a local anesthetic to said
minor upon the minor's express request, even though the boy's
9 Lacey v. Laird, supra, n. 3.
10 Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N. W. 99 (1935).
11 Supra, n. 3.
12 Supra, n. 3, at 17.
13 237 Mich. 76, 211 N. W. 75 (1926).
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mother expressly stated to the physician before the operation
that only a general anesthetic was to be used. It was held that
the mother's consent with the surgeon could be altered by the
nineteen year-old son and that "he had a legal right to contract
with the defendant for the performance of the surgical opera-
tion."
When an individual, who is capable of giving consent, gen-
erally consents to an operation; i.e., to do whatever is necessary
to relieve his condition, such individual "will be presumed to
have authorized the surgeon to perform such operation as may
be required by the conditions which he finds." 14 And when it
appears necessary to the surgeon in the course of the operation
to extend the scope of said operation beyond what was originally
contemplated, consent to such extension will be presumed.15
Under certain circumstances, consent need not be present in
order for a surgeon to operate. This usually occurs in cases of
emergency, where action on the part of the physician is necessary
for the preservation of the patient's life or health and it is im-
practicable to obtain consent before proceeding.16 This principle
has been applied where the patient has consented to some form
of treatment and in the course of this treatment an emergency
arises which makes it necessary for the physician to act in order
to preserve the patient's life or health.'7
Most cases do not specify just what "degree of emergency"
has to exist in order to come within this rule. They do indicate,
however, that is up to the surgeon in the exercise of his best
professional judgment to determine the necessity for an im-
mediate operation without first obtaining the required consent.' 8
One case'19 held that in order to come within this principle,
there must be an immediate danger to the health or life of the
patient and not merely some future danger. But this case dealt
with the unauthorized removal of Fallopian tubes and therefore
might be distinguished on the ground that courts are more
stringent in requiring consent when reproductive organs are
involved.
14 Harrison v. Reed, 21 Ohio N. P. (n. s.) 206 (Cin. Super. Ct. 1916).
15 Supra, n. 14.
16 Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106 (1912).
17 King v. Edwards, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 424 (Ct. App. 1932).
18 Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444 (1931).
19 Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S. W. 2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
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In Kennedy v. Parrott20 it was held that the rule which en-
ables a surgeon to extend an operation without the express
consent of the patient is not merely confined to emergency cases.
The court indicated that ordinarily the surgeon is justified in
believing his patient has consented to such an operation as ap-
proved surgery demands in order to relieve the cause of the
patient's affliction. The court said, in effect, that: 21
In major operations, where the true condition will not be
known until the operation is made, there is implied consent
to extension of the operation, as the physician's good judg-
ment dictates, if and when any diseased condition is found,
if no one able to give consent is readily available.
Under the common law rule, a surgeon was required to
obtain the consent of the patient before performing any other
operation than that contracted for. In Bennan v. Parsonnet22 it
was said that this rule was based upon the circumstance that
the patient in early times was a conscious participant in surgical
operations performed upon himself, and his consent could be
obtained in all instances. But surgical employment of anesthetics,
which render the patient unable to consent during the operation,
has been said to have swept away the entire foundation of the
common law rule.
In light of these conditions effected by the use of anes-
thetics, the law requires someone to act for the patient, in his
own interest. In other words, if the patient has not chosen such
a representative, the law will recognize the surgeon himself as
the one in whom the patient places confidence and on whose
judgment the patient would presumably rely. However, this
implication of representation was said not to give the surgeon
authority to operate upon a patient against his will, or to perform
an operation of a different sort from that to which he had con-
sented or one that involved risks and results of a kind not con-
templated-unless the operation was within the general lines of
the curative treatment agreed upon between the parties.
The above principles are set forth in the case of Bennan v.
Parsonnet,23 in which a surgeon, having undertaken to operate
20 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956).
21 Id. at 755. See, Wasmuth, Consent to Surgical Procedures, 6 Clev-Mar.
L. R. 235 (1957).
22 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
23 Ibid.
May, 1962
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss2/8
CONSENT TO SURGERY
to correct a hernia in the patient's left groin and, having placed
him under an anesthetic, discovered a more dangerous hernia
in the right groin and proceeded to operate on that. The court,
holding that the surgeon was not liable, based its decision on the
ground that the surgeon was the patient's representative to act
in his behalf because the patient was under an anesthetic. It
was also said that rupture is simply a protrusion of the intestine;
and, whether it occurs on the right side or on the left, the intes-
tine is the same; the muscular wall is the same; the operation is
the same; and its dangers and risks are the same. The court con-
cluded that "Under these circumstances, the operation that was
performed was not in any true sense against the will of the
patient or in any legal sense an operation of a different sort from
that which the plaintiff had consented to undergo." 24
It was held in Re Johnson's Estate25 that the surgeon was
justified in operating upon an organ other than that which it was
originally contemplated would be treated. The surgeon, engaged
by the patient's regular doctor to remove a uterine tumor which
he had diagnosed, made his own examination and instead re-
moved the patient's diseased appendix without having informed
either her or her regular physician of his intention to do so. The
court said that while there was no evidence that the plaintiff
had consented to the removal of her appendix, the evidence of
her medical witness was that, upon finding the condition of the
appendix as he did, the defendant surgeon should have removed
it; and there was no evidence that the removal caused any of
the damage for which the plaintiff sought recovery. Thus, it was
held error to give an instruction authorizing a verdict for the
plaintiff if the jury found that the appendix had been removed
without her consent and that she suffered damage as a result of
this act. It would seem that the Nebraska court felt that the
plaintiff's authorization was broad enough to cover whatever
trouble was causing her discomfort, and that the surgeon was
justified in operating upon an organ different from that origi-
nally contemplated.
The rule is different in cases where consent is given to re-
move a certain organ, and reproductive organs are removed or
operated on instead. Courts have held that where there is no
express consent to such an operation, there shall be no implied
24 Id. at 951.
25 145 Neb. 333, 16 N. W. 2d 504 (1944).
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consent. In Tabor v. Scobee26 the plaintiff, a minor, was operated
on for appendicitis. During the operation, finding that the
patient's Fallopian tubes were full of pus, swollen, and sealed at
both ends, the defendant removed them without the consent of
the plaintiff or her stepmother who was in the hospital. The
plaintiff was sterilized. The court ruled that there was no implied
consent present. Evidence indicated that removal of the tubes
would have been necessary soon, and that their remaining in the
body in their swollen and infected condition was dangerous; but
evidence did not establish that their removal was an emergency
in the sense that death would likely ensue immediately if the
tubes were not removed. Although delay in their removal might
have been harmful or fatal, there was still time to give the patient
and the parent an opportunity to decide the fateful question.
The court said that had the plaintiff been operated upon origi-
nally for the removal of her Fallopian tubes, and had her appen-
dix been removed without her consent, then consent to the
removal of her appendix would be implied, on the ground that
the appendix is considered by scientists generally to be of no
utility and a danger or a potential danger.
Where reproductive organs are involved, the courts are
reluctant to say that a surgeon had implied consent to operate
thereon, if no consent to do so was present. Thus, liability has
been upheld where the plaintiff submitted to a simple appen-
dectomy but during the course of the operation the physician
performed a hysterectomy.
2 7
It has been held that where the factor of mistake is present,
a surgeon is liable, at least where the mistake is the result of his
own fault or negligence. This is especially true if a surgeon
engaged to operate on a particular organ performs the operation
on another and sound part of the body by mistake.2 8
Authorization of a minor operation does not ordinarily justify
the performance of a major operation which involves risks or
results of a kind not contemplated.2 9 It has been recognized that
where a patient consents only to minor surgery, the doctor who
proceeds to perform major surgery may be held for a technical
battery. This is true at least in the absence of a showing that in
26 Supra, n. 19.
27 Rogers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119 S. 2d 649 (La. App. 1960).
28 Moos v. United States, 225 F. 2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955).
29 Supra, n. 6.
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the course of the operation he was confronted with an emergency
justifying the implication that the patient would have consented
to the extension of the treatment.
In Wall v. Brim30 a doctor, believing that a cyst lay immedi-
ately beneath the skin, told the patient that its removal would
involve only a minor operation taking about ten minutes. But
when the incision was made, the surgeon found that the cyst in-
volved the lower tissue. He did not inform her of the condition
but proceeded with the removal, unavoidably injuring adjacent
nerves. A question for the jury was raised as to whether the
surgeon was guilty of an actionable tort. The court noted medi-
cal testimony that the patient should have been advised of the
condition before the operation was proceeded with, and further-
more stated that consent obtained under a mistaken diagnosis of
a simple operation did not authorize a more difficult and dan-
gerous operation when a later diagnosis, while the patient was
still conscious and no emergency existed, disclosed the true con-
dition.
In Ohio there is authority to the effect that physicians em-
ployed to perform a minor operation who, without the knowledge
or consent of an unconscious patient, agreed among themselves
to perform a major operation, are, as a matter of law, liable in
damages unless there existed a life and death emergency.31 But
in Harrison v. Reed 32 the court seemed to rule otherwise. A doc-
tor, engaged to correct a condition from which the plaintiff was
suffering, undertook to perform an operation upon her lower
abdomen. After the lower incison was made, the doctor felt that
it was necessary to make an incision on the upper abdomen in
order to remedy the disorder. The court stated that under the
circumstances of this case he had implied authority to do so; and
furthermore, that the law implied the consent of the patient to
do all things necessary to alleviate her condition. It was held
that evidence of an admission by the defendant surgeon that he
had made the upper incision only to examine conditions left
by a previous operation did not justify any inference of wrong-
doing on his part, for it was necessary that he make this incision
in order to locate the source of the trouble.
Where there is evidence that a physician has been authorized
only to perform more or less minor surgery, but has proceeded
30 138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
31 Supra, n. 17.
82 Supra, n. 14.
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to perform a more serious operation involving the removal or
amputation of various organs, a verdict for the plaintiff is said to
be justified.33
The practice of having patients execute forms of general con-
sent to whatever treatment may be found necessary has been
adopted by some hospitals and physicians. The execution of such
a form has been recognized in some of the cases as at least evi-
dence which may be considered on the issue whether the exten-
sion of the operation was authorized. In Wheeler v. Barker
34
evidence that the plaintiff signed a consent upon her admission
to the hospital to whatever operation might be deemed necessary
or advisable was held to have been properly submitted to the
jury, in spite of plaintiff's contention that she was under opiates
at the time she signed and did not realize what she was doing.
The consent to an operation has usually been held to include
authorization for the surgeon to take necessary additional steps
to correct or repair conditions caused by the surgery, at least
where the condition in question was not the result of the phy-
sician's negligence. In some cases it has been held that where an
incision is reopened to remove an object left therein, the re-
opening is not a separate and independent operation but inci-
dental to and a part of the main one and so authorized. Thus, it
was said in Higley v. Jeffrey35 that the surgeon was not liable
for performing an unauthorized operation when he reopened the
incision.
In conclusion, it may be observed that many inroads have
been made upon the general rule stated at the outset-that con-
sent of the patient is necessary for the performance of a legal
operation. In almost every instance, these have depended upon
and have been the result of the specific and peculiar factual
situations under which the cases have arisen.
33 Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 P. 683 (1924); Hundley v. St.
Francis Hospital, 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P. 2d 131 (1958).
34 92 Cal. App. 2d 766, 208 P. 2d 68 (1949).
35 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932).
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